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F 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UA~H 
_ _ _ _ _ 1 • • , / 1qrr 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS 
E. BRACKENBURY, 
Defendants and Appellants: 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 16372 
PETITIONER, Roger N. Anderson, by and through his attorney, 
S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and pursuant to Rule 
76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions this 
Court for rehearing in the above-entitled matter. Petitioner 
respectfully suggests that the Court erred in the following 
particulars: 
1. The Court did not apply the proper standard in deter-
mining the prejudice to petitioner of the lower court's con-
stitutional error. Past decisions of this Court and the United 
States Supreme Court require that the beneficiary of constitu-
tional error demonstrate the harmlessness of such error beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The State failed to meet that burden in this 
case and petitioner's conviction, therefore, must be reversed. 
2. The Court improperly considered the so-called "false 
statements" of the allegedly tampered-with witness in its deter-
mination that the State had surmounted its burden at the pre-
liminary hearing. The Court condemned the use, at the prelim-
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inary hearing, of the hearsay affidavit of Ray Applegate, the 
State's only material witness, but concluded that in this case 
any error on the part of the lower court in admitting such an 
affidavit was "harmless" or "nonprejudicial" to petitioner 
because the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, when 
considered together with Applegate's "false statements," was 
sufficient to surmount the State's burden at the hearing. 
Petitioner urges that the "false statements" proffered by the 
State could not be considered by the lower court because they 
were not only unsworn hearsay, already condemned by the court's 
original opinion, but also because without the constitutionally 
condemned affidavit, they were supported by no evidentiary 
foundation. 
3. The Court should consider the arguments of petitioner 
with respect to the constitutionality and proper interpretation 
of Utah Code Annotated §76-8-508, the Code section for the 
violation of which petitioner was charged and convicted. Such 
arguments were originally dismissed without analysis. This 
section of the Code has not been carefully and analytically 
interpreted by the Court, and the arguments of petitioner and 
the state present the Court with an opportunity to clarify 
existing inherent ambiguities with respect to the proper inter-
pretation of that section. 
Petitioner Roger N. Anderson's Brief on Rehearing accompanie 
this Petition and supports the same with points and 
-2-
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Petitioner requests that his Petition for Rehearing be granted. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 1980. 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to 
Robert Hansen and Earl F. Dorius, Utah Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 2nd day of 
July, 1980. 
'iJ4/(1%~ 
S CRETARY ~ \ . 
-~-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16,372 
ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E. 
BRACKENBURY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
PETITIONER ROGER N. ANDERSON'S BRIEF 
ON REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 29, 1980, in an opinion authored by Justice Richard 
i'laughan, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Roger 
N. Anderson (hereinafter, "petitioner") on the charge of tampering 
with a witness in violation of Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.) §76-8-
508. The conviction on the same charge of petitioner's original 
co-appellant, Thomas E. Brackenbury, was reversed on the basis 
that the latter had been granted immunity. 
The majority opinion carefully treated a single issue raised 
in petitioner's original brief on appeal: whether appellants had 
been denied a fair preliminary hearing in view of the lower court's 
admission of certain hearsay evidence in the form of an affidavit 
of a material witness, not present at the hearing. This Court 
concluded that the lower court's decision to admit the hearsay 
evidence impinged upon appellants' fundamental, constitutional 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary 
l1ear:-ing. (Maj. op. at 11.) The Cour:-t concluded, however, that any 
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prejudice resulting from the lower court's constitutional errc 
was harmless to appellants. (Maj. op. at 12.) A copy of ~er 
opinion is set forth in Appendix "A" of this petition. 
Respectfully, petitioner requests this Court to reconsid" 
its determination that any prejudice on the part of the lower 
court's error was "harmless" with respect to this petitioner. 
Further, petitioner requests this Court to consider and resolve 
those substantial issues raised in petitioner's original brief 
appeal, which were summarily dismissed by the majority without 
any consideration or analysis. Upon reconsideration, petit~M 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ERROR OF THE LOWER COURT IN ADMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE' 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE D~ 
AND PETITIONER'S CONVICTION, THEREFORE, MUST BE REVERSED. 
The majority opinion leaves no doubt as to the verity and 
damental nature of the following propositions. First, an accu• 
enjoys a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. ~­
Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71 P. 2d 196, 199 (1937); Utah Constituti· 
Article I, § 13. Second, the preliminary hearing is an integr 
part of a "criminal prosecution," (see maj. op. at 5) and beca. 
it is an adversarial proceeding, "certain procedural safeguad' 
are recognized as necessary to guarantee the accused's~ 
right to a fair hearing." (Id., at 7.) (Emphasis added.) 
the fundamental purpose of a preliminary hearing is to ferret 
"groundless and improvident prosecutions." ( Id . , at 7 . ) Foe: 
ancillary purposes of the hearing include: ( 1) to effective' 
-2-
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advise defendant of the nature of the charges against him; (2) to 
provide defendant with a means of effectuating discovery through the 
uncovering and preservation of favorable evidence in his behalf; and 
(1) to aid defendant in preparation of his defense for the subse-
quent trial. (_!i, at 8.) The majority recognized the crucial inter-
play between a fair preliminary hearing and a fair trial: 
(t]he discovery available at the preliminary hearing represents 
an important step in the preparation of the defendant's defense 
for the subsequent trial. The opportunity to prepare an effec-
tive defense is recognized as essential to the preservation of 
the defendant's substantive right to a fair trial. Thus, here 
again, effectuation of the ancillary purposes of the preliminary 
hearing mandates the application of certain procedual safeguards 
to the hearing itself. [Footnotes omitted.] 
_!j_, at 8-9. (Emphasis added.) 
Fifth, the majority, after analyzing the interrelationship 
of the rights of confrontation of witnesses, assistance of counsel, 
and presentation of a defense, concluded that these rights must be 
guaranteed at the preliminary hearing. {Id., at 10.) 
Finally, the majority, in analyzing the scope of defendant's 
right of confrontation of witnesses, specifically held that such 
substantive right includes "the procedural right of cross-examination," 
(id., at 10) and concluded that cross-examination is "essential to the 
preservation of a fair hearing" and hence, a fair trial. (Id. at 
11.) (Emphasis added.) 
With the foregoing propositions, and the policy and constitu-
tional considerations supporting them, petitioner completely agrees. 
Petitioner cannot agree with this Court's conclusion, however, 
that the lower court's denial of petitioner's constitutional right 
to cross-examine the State's only material witness at the prelimi-
nary hearing constituted harmless erro~ for two reasons. 
-3-
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A. Before constitutional error can be held harmless, it 
must be determined to be harm less beyond are,-isor1abfe 
doubt. ----
At stake here i.s petitioner's constitutional right to cross-
examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Perhaps even more 
importantly, because of the interplay between a fair preliminacy 
hearing and a fair trial, petitioner's constitutional rights to 
prepare and present a meaningful defense at a fair trial are alsJ 
in issue. The lower court's interpretation of U.C.A. §77-15-19 
completely denied petitioner these rights. The narrow question 
here, then, is whether the denial of these constitutional rights 
prejudiced petitioner. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Erl. 
705 (1967), the United States Supreme Court announced the standat 
for determining whether constitutional error should be considered 
harmless or prejudicial: 
In fashioning a harmless-constitutional-error rule, ~ 
must recognize that harmless-error rules can work very mi~ 
chievous results when, for example, highly important and per· 
suasive evidence, or argument, though legally forbidden, fini 
its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or inno-
cence is a close one. What harmless-error rules all aim at 
is a rule that will save the good in harmless-error practice• 
while avoiding the bad, so far as possible. 
We prefer the approach of thi.s Court in deciding what 
was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. State of 
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171. The: 
we said: "The question is whether there i.s a reasonable Pil_'.'.. 
bility that the evidence complained of might have contri~ 
the conviction." Id., at 86-87, 84 s.ct. at 230 .•.. Att 
same time, however, like the federal harmless-error statu~. 
it emphasizes an intention not to treat as harmless those 
constitutional errors that "affect substantial rights" of a 
party •••• Certainly error, constitutional error, ~
admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, c1~ 
someone other than the person prejudiced by it a bm·den to 
show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the 
-4-
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origi~al common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on 
the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was 
no_ injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obta.i.ned 
judgment. There is little, if any, difference between our 
Statement in Fahy v. State of Connecticut about "whether 
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained 
of might have contributed to the conviction" and requiring 
the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained. [Footnotes omitted.) 
Id., 386 U.S. at 22-24, 87 S.Ct. at 827-28. (Emphasis added.) 
This standard is virtually universal. This Court, and its 
~mbers individually, in majority, dissenting and concurring opin-
ions have both implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the appli-
cability of this standard of review in cases involving constitutional 
error under either the federal or state constitution. State v. 
Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979); State v. Sandoval, 590 P.2d 
346, 348 (Utah 1979) (Wilkens, J. dissenting); State v. Codianna, 
572 P.2d 343, 249 (Utah 1977); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 
1356 (Utah 1977) (Crockett, J., concurring); State v. Eaton, 569 
P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466, 469 
(Utah 1975); State v. Kazda, 540 P. 2d 949, 951-953 (Utah 1975) 
(Maughan, J., concurring); State v. Jordan, 26 Utah2d 240, 487 
P.2d 1281, 1287 (1971) (Callister, C.J., dissenting); State v. 
Scandrett, 24 Utah2d 202, 468 P. 2d 639, 643 (1970); and, State v. 
Martinez, 23 Utah2d 62, 457 P. 2d 613, 614 (1969). 
As this Court stated in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah2d 202, 
468 P. 2d 639 ( 1970): 
There are two differing views as to the effect of error 
in violating a constitutional right. On the one hand it is 
sometimes stated that the violation of such a right should be 
-5-
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deemed prejudicia~ per se; and on the.other, that it may 
depend upon the c1rcumstances. The f1rst proposition hac 
the frailty of most generalities. Simply that it is nM, 
universally true. There are certainly conceivable circ~rn­
stances where the violation of a constitutional right cou' 
have no possible bearing upon any unfairness or: irnpositio.· 
upon the defendant, or upon a cor-rect determL,cition of hi·, 
or innocence. We think the correct view, and the one whi; 
is both practical and in keeping with. the desired objecti• 
of fundamental fairness and due process of law, is that tn, 
is a presumption that such error is prejudicial, but that,-
can be overcome when the court is convinced beyond a rea\O:' 
able doubt that it had no such prejudicial effect upon t~ 
proceedings. 
Id., 468 P.2d at 643. (Emphasis added.) See Also, State v. Lee., 
P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1978) (Wilkens, J., dissenting); State v. Tic., 
584 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1978) (Wilkens, J., dissenting); andSt· 
Hodges, 30 Utah2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1974). 
Critical constitutional rights are at stake in this ca~. 
Egregious error was committed below which effectively denied 
petitioner his rights of confrontation, preparation of defense, 
and fair trial. The standard is clear. It is presumed that t:. 
error beloW" was prej ud ic.ial, (Chapman, supra, and Scandrett, !, 
and the burden is on the beneficiary of the error (the State)'. 
show that such was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapmar 
supra, 386 u. s. at 24. Because the State did not meet its buri 
the cause must be reversed. (The majority opinion, in support 
of its holding that petitioner was not prejudiced in this case 
the lower court's constitutional error, relied upon State v. 
Hamilton, 18 Utah2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966). Hamilton pr~~ 
Chapman and the Utah cases cited above which have adopted the 
dard and rationale announced in Chapman. To the extent that 
-6-
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Scandrett and Chapman are inconsistent with Hamilton, petitioner 
suggests that the latter must be deemed to have been overruled sub 
silentio.) 
B. Under any standard of review, the lower court's error 
was prejudicial, and, therefore, warrants reversal. 
The majority opinion carefully stated the burden the State 
must bear at the preliminary hearing: 
Preliminary examinations in Utah are adversarial pro-
ceedings in which the prosecution must present evidence 
sufficient to establish: (1) that a public offense has been 
committed, and (2) sufficient cause to believe the defendant 
guilty thereof. 
* * * 
Conversely the probable cause showing at the prelimi-
any examination must establish a prima facie case against 
the defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude 
the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged. 
The prosecution is not required to introduce enough evi-
dence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence sufficient to 
warrant submission of the case of the trier of fact. [Footnotes 
omitted.) 
(Maj. op. at 5-6.) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, prosecution must present sufficient evidence to estab-
lish a prima facie case and to warrant submission of the case to 
the trier of fact. If the prosecution fails this burden, defendant 
cannot be bound over for trial without denial of his constitutional 
rights enumerated above. Such error, in binding defendant over 
for trial despite the failure of the prosecution to sustain its 
burden at the hearing, would always be inherently prejudicial. 
Defendant would be bound over for trial without an adequate prelimi-
nary hearing, and because of the interplay between a fair hearing 
and a fair trial, the denial of a constitutionally acceptable hearing 
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would operate as a denial of a fair trial. 
The record clearly establishes that the State failed to llle?t 
its burden at the preliminary hearing in this case. In ~ 
Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979) this Court clearly esta~ 
lished the elements of the crime of witness tampering: ( 1) de-
fendant must know an "official investigation" is "in progress"; 
(2) he must know that the person allegedly tampered with has 
been or will be designated as a "witness" in the official investi-
gation; and (3) he must induce or cause the "witness" to "testi~ 
or "inform" falsely. To meet its burden of establishing a prima 
facie case at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution had to 
present evidence as to each of these elements. 
Only two wi.tnesses--James Garner and Irvine J. Curtis--were 
present and testified at the preliminary hearing. No other ad-
missible evidence was thereat presented. James Garner's 
direct testimony was extremely brief. He merely reported that~ 
was the owner of a saloon in Soldier Summit, that on the eveni~ 
of May 28, 1978, he was involved in an altercation with peti-
tioner, and that, as a result of the altercation, he was arrested, 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 34-35.) Garner did not give 
testimony as to any of the elements of the crime of witness tam-
pering, i.e., that petitioner believed an official investigation 
had been instituted, that petitioner knew that Ray Applegate (th' 
alleged victim) had been designated as a "witness" in the offici' 
investigation, and, most importantly, that petitioner induced or 
otherwise cause Applegate to testify or inform falsely. 
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Irvine J. Curtis' testimony was also brief. Curtis testified 
that on the night in question, he formally placed James Garner 
under arrest and transported him to the Utah County Jail. (Id., 
at 36-37.) Curtis also testified with respect to two conversations 
he had conducted with petitioner concerning written statements 
secured by petitioner from Applegate. (Id., at 38-40.) Curtis 
had never actually seen the statements, and his testimony was not 
used to lay a foundation for their admission into evidence. Al-
though, based upon Curtis' testimony, the lower court could have 
surmised that Applegate's statements were taken with some force, 
Curtis did not testify as to the key element of the crime of 
witness tampering, i.e., that petitioner induced or otherwise 
caused Applegate to testify or inform falsely. That petitioner 
may have used some force in securing the statements is not ipso 
facto prima facie evidence as to the falsity of the same. More-
over, Curtis' testimony did not offer prima facie evidence with 
respect to the other elements of the crime. Thus, the testimony 
of these two witnesses, standing alone, was wholly incapable of 
satifsying the burden of the State to present a prima facie case 
with respect to petitioner's guilt of the crime charged. 
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing by the prosecution, the Court noted 
in its May 29 opinion: 
[w)e must turn now to determine the effect of this 
holding in the present case. Although the judge's inter-
pretation of the statute and his acceptance of th7 h7a:say 
evidence constitute error, that error was not preJudicial to 
the defendants. Rather, in this case, the error was rendered 
harmless by the testimony of the other witnesses at the hear-
ing. Their testimony, when considered in conjunction with 
-9-
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the copies of the false statements signed by Applegate f 
were presented at the hearing, was sufficient t~' 
the prosecution's burden and establish sufficient caus/ •. 
bind the matter over to trial. · 
(Maj. op. at 12.) (Emphasis added.) 
The testimony of Curtis and Garner, only when considerec. 
conjunction with the "false statements" signed by Applegate,,,, 
held to be sufficient to surmount the State's burden at the h0: 
ing. Petitioner agrees with the Court's conclusion that ~e ~ 
mony of Garner and Curtis, standing alone, was insufficient to·. 
the State's burden, but petitioner believes the Court erred in 
concluding that the "false statements" made by Applegate could 
used to fill the gaps of the State's burden resulting from t~ 
inadequate testimony of Garner and Curtis. Two reasons suppoc 
petitioner's conclusion. 
First, because the "false statements" of Applegate were a 
ted as part and parcel of the tainted hearsay affidavit alreac 
demned by this Court, such statements were likewise tainted a:, 
inadmissible. At the preliminary hearing, after the testimon) 
Garner and Curtis, the prosecution proffered the affidavit of 
Applegate, together with the so-called "false statements." (F: 
liminary Hearing Transcript at 43.) This Court has already~ 
demned the admission of the sworn affidavit as a violation of 
petitioner's constitutional rights. ~fortiori, under theser 
cumstances, the admission of the unsworn "false statements"~ 
made by Applegate, violated petitioner's constitutional right· 
Second, no foundation for the admission of the "false'~ 
ments" was laid at the hearing, and without the condemned at: 
the statements were inadmissible. No testimony was introd 1 ir 
-10-
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the preliminary hearing by way of foundation for the so-called 
"false statements" of Ray Applegate. None of the witnesses at the 
hearing had ever seen the statements, and no testimony was given 
with respect to their authenticity, truth or falsity, or chain of 
custody. Although the statements possibly could have been admitted 
with proper foundation had the admission of Applegate's affidavit 
not violated petitioner's constitutional rights, nevertheless, 
because this Court has concluded that the affidavit was improperly 
used, no other evidentiary foundation justified the admission of 
the statements. Finally, the prosecution attempted to justify the 
admission of the "false statements" with the claim that such had been 
made a part of the depositions of George Schade, Mayor of Soldier 
Summit, and Thomas Brackenbury, petitioner's original co-appellant. 
Such attempted justification is without merit for two reasons. 
First, the depositions of Schade and Brackenbury were never 
published in the record, or otherwise admitted into evidence at 
the preliminary hearing. Schade had not been charged in this case, 
and Brackenbury's deposition was not formally used by the prose-
cution at the preliminary hearing. Second, evidence given by 
Brackenbury, who had been granted immunity by the prosecution, 
could not constitutionally be used against Anderson unless Brackenbury 
testified and was subject to cross-examination at the hearing. 
(Maj. op. at 10-11.) See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123, 134-137, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 467 (1968) and Robert v. 
~ussell, 392 U.S. 293, 294, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d llOO (1968). 
Because Brackenbury did not testify thereat, the so-called "false-
statements" made by Applegate and found in Brackenbury' s deposi ti.on· 
-ll-
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could not be admitted into evidence against Anderson for purp0 ,, 
of fulfilling the State's burden at the hearing. 
In short, only the constitutionally unacceptable hearsay, 
erroneously admitted by the lower court, could have served as 
sufficient evidence to establish the requisite prima faci_e casP, 
justifying petitioner's being bound over for trial. At a pre-
liminary he-aring on the charge of witness tampering, only the 
person allegedly tampered with possesses sufficient personal 
knowledge to establish a prima facie case against the defendant. 
Thus, Applegate' s absence from the preliminary examination pre-
vented the State from meeting its burden of establishing a pri~ 
facie case against petitioner and therefore, petitioner was 
wrongfully tried. The State attempted to rely upon a hearsay 
affidavit of the only material witness against petitioner, Ray 
Applegate. This Court has already condemned the error in ad-
mitting such hearsay. The prejudice is inherent. But for the 
tainted evidence, petitioner would never have been bound over 
for trial. (That petitioner was ultimately convicted as charged, 
is no retroactive justification for the denial of his rights W 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to receive a fair hearir 
and trial.) 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER PETITIONER'S OTHER ARGUMENTS 
RAISED IN HIS INITIAL BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
The May 29, 1980 opinion of the Court analyzed and resolv~ 
two of the issues petitioner raised in his initial brief on ap~ 
In addition to the preliminary hearing question, the majority c 
-12-
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sidered and resolved the issue of whether petitioner's original 
co-appellant, Thomas E. Brackenbury, had been granted immunity by 
lhP Wasatch County Attorney. The majority did not resolve three 
other issues raised by petitioner in his original brief on appeal. 
Petitioner respectfully requests the Court to consider these issues 
Jnd resolve the same in favor of reversal of petitioner's convic-
tion. 
The issues initially raised by petitioner, but left unresolved 
by the Court, essentially all concern the interpretation of U.C.A. 
§76-8-508, the criminal code section for the violation of which 
petitioner was originally convicted. This Court has previously 
considered U.C.A. §76-8-508 only once. See, State v. Danker, 599 
P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979). Danker did not involve an attempt by 
defendant to induce or cause a person to testify or inform falsely. 
Rather, Danker involved the defendant's attempt to withhold testimony 
or information. In Danker, no apparent challenge was made to U.C.A. 
§76-8-508 on constitutional grounds, as here. Further, defendant's 
primary arguments in Danker dealt not with the interpretation of 
U.C.A. §76-8-508, but with challenges to the lower court's eviden-
tiary rulings. Thus, this section of the Code has not been analy-
tically and carefully interpreted by the Court. 
One of the fundamental precepts upon which American govern-
ment is founded is the rule of law. Part and parcel of the rule 
of law is clarity and certainty. When a law is vague and over-
broad, arbitrariness and caprice reign, not clarity and certainty, 
,111d the rule of law is thereby undermined. Petitioner originally 
Jrgued on appeal that U.C.A. §76-8-508 was unconstitutionally 
-13-
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vague and overbroad and that petitioner could not be <JL:ilty or t> 
offense embodied therein as a matter of law. Both arguments nee, 
sitate an interpretation of §76-8-508; both concern pronounced 
ambiguities in that section as it currently reads. 
The State vigorously controverts petitioner's arguments wit:: 
respect to the interpretation and constitutionality of §76-8-508. 
With both sides of the issues so actively contested and forceful: 
presented, there is little reason to dismiss them without analysi' 
It is petitioner's position that ambiguities and overbreadth are 
inherent in §76-8-508; these issues will be repeatedly raised ~ 
other appellants until they are resolved. Such issues should ~ 
considered on rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Roger N. Anderson respectfully requests the Court to reverSt 
his conviction on the ground that the State failed to meet its b.· 
den of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, the harmlessness 
and non-prejudicial nature of the clear, constitutional error of 
the lower court in denying him his constitutional rights to ~~ 
front and cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, ~ 
receive a fundamentally fair preliminary hearing, and to prepare 
an adequate defense for a fair trial. 
Petitioner further requests this Court to grant his petitio: 
for rehearing to consider the constitutionality and proper in~~ 
pretation of U.C.A. §76-8-508. 
Respectfully submitted this __12tday of July , 1980. 
1/';,> 
--.~ 
// 
/ S •:,REX LEWI-5 . 
1.--: /, ,_ -c -~/ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----00000-----
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Roger Anderson and Thomas 
E. Brackenbury, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
RECEIVED 
1 ;_., ( ·J U 1980 
No. 16372 
t-:OWARD LEWIS & PETERS> F I L E D -
May 29, 1980 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
The defendants, Roger Anderson and Thomas Bracken-
ury, bring this appeal from their conviction for tampering 
with a witness in violation of 76-8-508. We uphold the 
conviction of Roger Anderson, hereinafter "Anderson," but 
set aside the conviction of Thomas Brackenbury, hereinafter 
"Brackenbury.-" All statutory references are to Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The factual basis of the jury conviction is re-
latively simple. The defendants, Anderson and Brackenbury, 
entered the J & M Saloon, located in Soldiers Summit, Utah, 
to investigate suspected illegal sale of alcohol. At the 
time of the incident in question, Anderson was the Chief of 
Police of Soldiers Summit and Brackenbury was the Justice of 
the Peace. In the saloon a confrontation ensued between 
Anderson and the manager of the saloon, James Garner, herein-
after "Garner." During the confrontation a patron of the 
saloon, Ray Applegate, hereinafter "Applegate," came to the 
aid of Garner, who referred to him as his bouncer. How-
ever, Applegate testified at trial that upon being informed 
Anderson was the Chief of Police he returned to his original 
place at the other end of the bar. 
The escalating confrontation ended when Garner 
struck Anderson in the face. Anderson announced that Garner 
was under arrest and, although emotionally distraught, left· 
the saloon to enjoin the aid of the police officer then on 
duty before taking Garner into custody. Once out of the 
saloon Brackenbury left Anderson and returned to his trailer. 
Upon enlisting the aid of Officer Butch Curtis, herein-
after "Curtis," Anderson, who was still quite excited from 
the earlier controversy, reentered the saloon and forcibly 
detained Garner. In the ensuing scuffle Garner was thrown 
to the floor, handcuffed and removed from the saloon. 
Curtis assumed custody of Garnpr and proceeded to 
the Utah County Jail to incarcerate him, while Anderson 
1. Garner was also taken to the Utah Valley Hospital for an 
examination and x-rays of his shoulder and elbow which he 
alleged were injured in the scuffle. 
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returned to the saloon in search of the "bouucec" l\pplea:., 
After finding Applegate there, l\nderso11 rcscorted hin 1 .tc;r 
the highway to Brackenbury's trailer, whict1 was also llS•;·J" 
the Justice Court of Soldiers Swnmit. 
Once inside the trailer, Anderson declared Appl::-
gate was under arre::!t for interfering with an oflicer in r 
course of his duty, and Brackenbury proclaimed the Justi· 
Court to be in session. According to the testimony of 
AJ?pl~gate, _ An~erson then proceedeg to physically intimidn 
him into signing false statements concerning the prior 
activities in the bar. The first two statements concerneG 
Garner striking Anderson and Applegate's purchase from 
ca:ner of liquor' "over the bar' II ~n the J & M Sa~oon. Th: I 
third statement recounted the details of the earlier incid,, 
in the bar and the arrest of Garner. Applegate testified:·.: 
signed the false sta t4men ts because he was scared of possi-
ble further violence. 
Applegate' s account of the incident in the trail/ 
was corroborated by the testimony of Curtis. Curtis testi-
fied that upon returning to Soldiers Summit, after deliver-
2. See State v. Bradsha1V, Utah, 541 P.2d 800 (1975) (whee' 
we held 76-8-305, interfering with a • law enforceme"' 
official, unconstitutional.) 
3. Applegate explained: 
"A. He (Anderson) grablJed me by my shirt and he said 
'Yes, you did it. You seen him strike me,' and picked~.-: 
and he tore my shirt across, like that. (Indicating) 
Q. What do you mean he picked you up? 1 
A. Picked me up by my shirt, raised me up out of th:! 
chair. 
Q. All right, when he picked you up did he say uy~ 
to you? 
A. He said, "Let me show you some judo, or somethir,: 
or another; and he put his leg out and he pushed me o~r 
leg backwards. ' 
Q. What happened to you? 
A. I hit the floor on my back. 
Q. And while you were lying on the floor what happ:r 
A. He picked me back up. 
Q. How? 
A. The same way, with my shirt. 
Q. Did he say anything to you while he was doing: 
A. He called me a cotton picking dink. 
Q. Did he call you anything else? 
A. When he picked me up he called me a he ~ 1 
that he said, 'I could kill you with my bare hands, 1 
fat - - an cl - - • ' " 
4. When asked why he did not defend himself from Andct" 
attack, Applegate explained: "Because I was scared; Fr 1 
identified himself in the bar as the Chief of Police, 
was in a court of law, and I couldn't see fighting ba·.·' 
court of law. Didn't seem lil~e the right thing to do· 
No. 16372 -2-
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ing Garner, he initiated a conversation with Anderson in 
which the former explained how he had procured a sworn 
statement from Applegate concerning the sale of liquor "over 
the bar" by Garner. When Curtis asked Anderson if the state-
ment was made voluntarily Anderson replied, "Well, I had to 
rough bim (Applegate) up a little bit, but I got the state-
ment. fl0 
Subsequently, the defendants were arrested for the 
crim6 of tampering with a witness in violation of 76-8-
508. The defendants appeared at their arraignment and 
requested a preliminary hearing. This request was granted 
and Anderson and Brackenbury were released on their own 
recognizance. 
At the preliminary hearing Garner and Curtis were 
presented as witnesses for the prosecution. However, 
instead of presenting Applegate at the preliminary examina-
tion, the prosecution moved to introduce Applegate's sworn 
affidavit relating the essence of his testimony. The prose-
cution explained Applegate would be present at the trial to 
testify, but they reasoned the inconvenience of bringing him 
from his home in Muskogee, Oklahoma, to Utah rendered his 
absence at the preliminary examination permissible and the 
adm~ssion of his sworn affidavit justified under 77-15-
19. The judge agreed with the prosecution's contentions 
5. Curtis also testified that Brackenbury, who was present 
at the conversation between Anderson and Curtis, stated that 
Anderson had roughed Applegate up "pretty good." 
6. 76-8-508. Tampering with witness - ••• A person is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree if: 
"(l) Believing that an official proceeding or investiga-
tion is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
"(a) Testify or inform falsely; or • " 
7. The Amendment to 77-15-19 states: 
"(2) The rules of evidence for trial of criminal cases 
shall apply at the preliminary examination, except that hear-
say evidence that would not be admissible at trial shall be 
admitted if the court determines that it would impose an un-
reasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness to 
require that the primary source of the evidence be produced at 
the hearing, and if the witness or party furnishes information 
bearing on the informant's reliability and, as far as possible, 
the means by which the information was obtained. When hear-
say evidence is admitted, the court, in determining the 
existence of sufficient cause, shall consider: 
"(a) Tlle extent to which the hearsay quality of the 
evidence affects the weight it should be given, and 
"(b) T'le likelihood of evidence other than hearsay 
being available at trial to provide the information furnished by 
lwarsay at the preliminary examination." 
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and allowed, over the objection o[ the def<'rtdant, the i1itc 
duction of the atfidavit into evidence. The judge fol!nd 
the evidence presented at the preliminary examLnation suffi-
cient to bind the matter over to the District Court for 
trial. At the subsequent trial, the defendants were convir·t 
by a jury of the crime as charged. 
The defendants' principal issue on appeal concerr,c 
the constitutionality of the procedure employed at the pre-
liminary hearing. Interpreting the recently enacted amendrr
1
.-. 
to 77-15-19 which allows the use of hearsay evidence at the 
preliminary hearing, the examining judge allowed the prosecu-
tion to introduce the sworn affidavit of its principal wi tnc 
Applegate. The defendants con tend the use of this affidavit ' 
in lieu of the personal appearance of Applegate at the exami: .• 1 
tion, abridged their constitutional right to be confront3ct 
by the witnesses against them in a criminal prosecution. 
This issue, presents important questions of first impression i 
to this Court concerning the application of the procedural 
safeguards embodied in Article I, Section 12, of the Utah 
Constitution to the preliminary examination. 
Article I, Section 12, outlines the protections 
guaranteed an individual in the course of a criminal pros~ 
cution. It provides: 
"In criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final 
8. The defendants contend the curtailment of their con-
stitutional and statutory right to cross-examine a material 
witness constitutes a denial of their right to a preliminar: 
examination. See Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitutioo-
Pursuant to 77-15-10 the defendants have a statutory right 
to have witnesses at the preliminary hearing cross-examine] 
in their behalf. However, the necessity of the prosecuti~ 
presenting a specific witness at the hearing in lieu oft~· 
introduction of an affidavit of his testimony lies outside 
the iscope of this statutory provision, and depends, rather 
on the constitutional protections afforded nll criminal 
defendants. While we agree the procedure employed abrid['." 
these protections it did not deprive the defendants of a 
preliminary hearing in this particular case. 
No. 16372 
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judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not he 
compelled to give evidence against him-
self; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense." 
. . The preliminary examina~ion of a person ac§used of 
a crime in Utah is part of the criminal prosecution. 
Therefore, a strict reading of the language of Section 12 
would provide the accused the entire panoply of guaranteed 
rights at the preliminary examination. However, the alloca-
tion of the various protections afforded by Section 12 is 
not dependent solely upon a strict interpretation of that 
section. 
Rather, the application of the various protec-
tions embodied in Section 12 to the several stages of a 
criminal prosecution is defined by the relationship between 
the specific proceedings and the protection off erect by the 
procedural safeguard. Only when the specific safeguard is 
necessary to effectuate the protection of a substantive 
right held by the accused will its application to the speci-
fic criminal proceeding be mandated. 
Therefore, before we will grant the accused a 
constitutional right of confrontation at the preliminary 
examination, we must examine the nature and purpose of that 
proceeding and determine i· confrontation is necessary to 
insure the protection of a~y substantive rights of the 
accused. 
Preliminary examinations in Utah are adversarial 
proceedings in which the prosecution must present evidence 
9. The inclusion of provisions concerning preliminary 
examinations in Utah's territorial laws evidences the impor-
tance of hearings in the state's criminal procedure. See 
Compiled Laws of Utah (territory), Vol. II, Chapter VII, 
Section 4872-4896 (1888). These provisions were incorpor-
ated into the State's early laws and some sections have 
remained unaltered to the present time. See Revised Statutes, 
Utah, Chapter 16, Section 4666 (1898); Compiled Laws, id., 
Section 4878, s. 99; compare 77-15-10. To characterize the 
preliminary examination as outside the scope of the "criminal 
prosecution" belies this heritage and the recognized impor-
tance of this proceeding. Cf., State v. Freedman, 93 Utah 
125, 71 P.2d 196 (1937); Thus, in Utah, as in Alabama, the 
preliminary hearing represents a critical stage in the 
criminal process and a part of the criminal prosecution. 
See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 26 L.Ed2d 387, 90 S.Ct. 
1999, (1969). 
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sufficient to establish; (a) that a public offense ha::; beeri 
committed, and ft)) sufficient cause to believe the dRfendari' 
guilty thereof. 
The probable cause showing necessary in the pre-
1 iminary examination differs from that required for an 
arrest warrant. In the l:itter, the facts presented r:iust b2 
sufficient to establish that an offense has lJeen comr.iitted 
and a reasonable belief the defendant committed it. The 
facts presented, however, do not ~fve to establish a pri~ 
facie case against the defendant. 
Conversely the probable cause showing at the pre-
liminary examination must establish a prima facie case 
against the defendant from which the trier of fact could 
conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged.:! 
The prosecution is not required to introduce 
enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond' • 
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence / 
suffip~ent to warrant submission of the case to the f~iffoc 1 fact. Also, the determination of sufficient cause to / 
bind the accused over for trial must be based on facts 
which are proved at the examination and may not depend on / 
the information, complaint or dpgosi tions taken before the 1 
issuance of the arrest warrant. · 
While the burden falls upon the prosecution to 
establish sufficient cause to believe the accused guiltyo 
the crime charged, the adversarial qualities of the exami••:· 
tion allow the defendant an opportunity to attack the pro;• 
tion's evidence and to present any affirmative defenses. 
Al though the hearing is not a trial per se, it is not an r 
parte proceeding nor one-sided determination of probable 
10. See United States v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 13 P. 67; 
appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 636, 36 L. Ed. 857 ( 1887), 12 
s.ct. 980, (1887); cf. 77-15-17. 
11. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L.Ed.2~ 
327, 79 S.Ct. 329, (1959). The finding of probable caus 2 
in the context of an arrest warrant usually rests excl~ 
sively on hearsay evidence. 
12. Eldredge, supra note 10, at 676; see also :1lyers 1" 
Corrmonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). In 
~lyers the Supreme Judicial Court of Hassachusetts adopt 
"directed verdict" rule in defining the minimum quantu~• 
evidence necessary to fulfill the probable cause requir, 
at the preliminary examination. The court explained, ". 
the mag is tr ate should dismiss the complaint when, on U' 
evidence presen tee!, a trial court would be bound to ac: 
as a matter of law." at 824. 
13. Thus, the minimum quantum of evidence is more tii:': 
required to establish probable cause for arrest but 12 
would prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonabl~" 
14. See 77-15-17. 
15. Eldredge, supra note 10, at 676. 
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cause, and the accused is granted a stf~utory right to 
cross-examine the witnesses against him, and 1 ~he right to subpoena and present witnesses in his defense. Thus, the 
preliminary examination is an adversarial proceeding in 
which certain procedural safeguards are recognized as nec-
essary to guar~ntee the accused's substantive right to a 
fair hearing. 
The fundamental purpose served by the preliminary 
examination is the2 6erretting out o~ groundless and improvi-dent prosecutions. The effectuation of this primary 
16. See Jennings v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 
59 Cal.Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304 (1967). 
17. See supra note 8. 
18. 77-15-8; 77-15-11; See also State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d 
396, 473 P.2d 388 (1970). 
19. See Myers v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 826. 
There the court explained: "In some cases, the evidence 
introduced in behalf of the defendant will do no more than 
raise a conflict which can best be resolved by a jury at the 
actual trial where the Commonwealth must prove the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in other cases, the 
evidence elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination or 
from the testimony of defense witnesses or from other evi-
dence may lead the examining magistrate to disbelieve the 
prosecution's witnesses a.nd discharge the defendant for lack 
of probable cause." [Footnote omitted] 
20. See Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 9; People ex rel. 
Leidner v. District Court, Colo., 597 P.2d 1040 (1979). 
Reference to the historical foundation of the modern pre-
liminary examination illustrates this primary purpose of 
ferretting out unwarranted and improvident prosecutions. In 
1554 the English Parliament enacted a statute granting 
certain persons accused of crimes the right of an examina-
tion before a Justice of the Peace. (1 and 2 - Phillip and 
Mary, Chapters XIII, 1554). However, the right was limited 
to persons accused of crimes subject to bail or mainprise. 
The following year in what Blackstone (Volume IV, page 296), 
referred to as the basis of the modern preliminary hearing, 
the English parliament extended the previous right to a pre-
trial examination to individuals accused of non-bailable 
cri1:ies. (2 and 3 Phillip and \!ary, Chapter X, 1555). In 
extending the protection embodied in the examination the 
parliament recognized: "And for as much as t11e said act (of 
1554) doth not extend to such prisoners as shall be brought 
before any justice of peace for manslaughter or felony, and 
by such justice shall be committed to ward for the suspicion 
of such manslaughter or felony, and not bailed, in which 
case the examination of such prisoners, and of such as shall 
bring him, is as necessary, or rather more than where such 
prisoner shall he let to bail or mainprise ••. " [as quoted 
in Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa.S. 382, 124 A.2d 666, 
670 (1056).] The protection afforded the accused by the 
(Continued next page) 
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purpose relieves the accused from the substantial degrada-
tion and expense incident to a 1:ioc!ern ccimi.na l trial when 
the charges against him are unwarranted or the evidence 
insufficient. Therefore, the grave injustice suffered by 
the defendant in an unwarranted prosecution may be elimi-
nated by the efficient administration 6f the preliminary 
examination. This, also, demands the application of certah 
basic procedural safeguards to that proceeding. 
Several ancillary purposes supplement the primary 
purpose of the hearing; The examination provides a means of 
effectively advising the2 ~efendant of the nature of the 
accusations against him. The hearing also provides a 
discovery device in which the defendant is not only informed 
of the nature of the State's case against him, but is pro-
vided a means ~2 which he can discover and preserve favor-
able evidence. 
The discovery available at the preliminary hear~· 
represents an important step in the preparati2~ of the 0 
defendant's defense for the subsequent trial. The oppor-
tunity to prepare an effective defense is recognized as 
essential to the preservati2~ of the defendant's substan-
tive right to a fair trial. Thus, here again, effectuatio· I 
(Footnote No. 20 continued) 
examination is the right not to be imprisoned and held to 
answer at trial under a malicious or ur1,·1arranted prosecu-
tion. This is reflected in the procedure of the early 
examinations where as explained by Blackstone: "The justice' 
before whom such prisoner is brought is bound immediately t0, 
examine the circumstances of the crime alleged * * * if upo, i 
this inquiry it manifestly appears that either no such cri~2' 
was committed or that the suspicions entertained of the 
prisoner was wholly groundless in such case only is it 
lawful to totally discharge him." (O'Brien, id., at 671). 
21. See State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860 (1918). 
22. See Lataille v. District Court of Eastern Hampden, 
366 Mass. 525, 320 N.E.2d 877 (1974). 
23. The importance of the ancillary discovery attendant~ 
the preliminary hearing is moderated by the existence of 
other discovery devices avail;i,ble to the defendant. Thus, 
in Colorado where an extensive procedural panoply of dis-
covery devices is granted the criminal defendant the di~ 
covery incident to the preliminary hearing is relatively 
unirnportant. See Rex v. Sullivan, 194 Colo. 568, 575 P.2i 
408 (1978). 
24. See State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 169, 96 P. 1085, (!' 
In Jensen this Court explained: "The purpose of this pro1 
sion of the Constitution [Article I, Section 13] is to 
secure to the accused before he is brought to trial uade:· 
information, the right to be actvisect of the nature of the 
accusation against him and to be con Eron ted with and give 
an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying on 
behalf of the state. Ile is thus 1_•:1abled, if he so des in 
to fully inform himself of the facts upon which the statr 
(Continued next page) 
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of the ancillary purposes of the preliminary hearing man-
d:i tcs the application of certain procedural safeguards to 
the hearing itself. 
Our review of the nature and purpose of the pre-
liminary examination illustrates the critical character of 
the proceeding in relation to various substantive rights of 
the defendant which are subject to infringement by the 
exclusion of certain proc2gural safeguards at this step in 
the criminal prosecution. 
Recognizing the "critical" character of this 
proceeding the Supreme Court has extended the right of 
counsel (as embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Feder~$ 
Constitution) to an indigent at the preliminary hearing. 
Similarly the California Supreme Court has granted the 
accused the right to compel the attendance 97 witnesses for 
his defense at the preliminary examination.~ The pro-
tections afforded by the right of confrontation at the 
preliminary examination are equally important and so inter-
related to the right t28effective counsel and the pre-
sentation of a defense that they must be guaranteed the 
(Footnote No. 24 continued) 
relies to sustain the charge made against him, and be pre-
pared to meet them at the trial." at 1086. 
25. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 
1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926, (1967), the United States Supreme Court 
recognized the protections embodied in the Sixth Amendment 
(which are echoed in Article I, Section 12, of the Utah 
Constitution) apply to "critical" stages of the proceeding -
" ••• where the results might well settle the accused's fate 
and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." (at 
225). In Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 9, at 9, the Court 
clarified this terminology by explaining, "The determination 
whether the (preliminary) hearing is a 'critical stage' 
. depends, as noted, upon an analysis 'whether potential 
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inhere in the 
. confrontation '" 
26. See Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 9, at 9. ("Plainly 
the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is 
essential to protect the indigent accused against an erron-
eous or improper prosecution.") 
27. See Jennings, supra note 16. 
28. The crucial interrelationship between confrontation 
and the assistance of counsel and the preparation of a 
defense was implicitly recognized in Coleman v. Alabama, 
supra note 9, at 9, where the Court delineated the nature 
of the protection afforded by the guiding hand of counsel, 
by explaining, "First, the lawyer's skilled examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses 
in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse 
(Continued next page) 
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accused at the preliminary hearing. 
Classically, the primary object of the constitu-
tional right of confrontation is to prevent depositions a"'' 
ex parte affidav.i ts from being used against the accused at 
trial in lieu of a personal examination and cross-ex:.unina-
tion of the witness against him. \'/hen confrontation is a\', 
able the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing th. 
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but 
of compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in , 
order that they may look at him and judge by his demeanor 1 
and the manner in 2~hich he gives his testimony whether he is I 
worthy of belief. Encompassed in this right of3 5onfronta- ! tion is the procedural right of cross-examination and the/, 
recognition of certain procedural rights regarding the , 
exclusion of extra judicial statements, similar to those 
fo~nd pro3Icted by evidentiary rules excluding hearsay 
evidence. 
The adversarial nature of the preliminary hearing [ 
is conducive to the imposition of these procedural safe-
guards. The application of the right of cross-examinati~, 
and the exclusion of· certain out of court statements at tl:i' 
stage of the criminal prosecution insures essential pro-
tection of the defendant's substantive rights. 
Specifically, the cross-examination of witnesses 
presenting testimony against the accused at the hearing 
(Footnote No. 28 continued). 
to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skill: 
interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can 
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-exarnin~ 
tion of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve 
testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does 
not app?ar at the trial. Third, trained counsel can r:iore 
effectively discover the case the State has against his 
client and r.iake possible the preparation of a proper defer.: 
to meet that case at the trial." 
29. See '.!attox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 39 L.Ed. 
409, 15 S.C. 337, (1894). See also, State v. Uannion, 19 
Utah 505, 57 P. 542 (1899). 
30. See State v. King, 24 Utah 482, 68 P. 418 (1902). 
31. However, the Supreme Court of the United States poi:· 
out in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 26 L.Ed.2d 489,, 
90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970) that the confrontation clause is no'./ 
cons ti tutionaliza ti on of eviden tiary rules concerning he,': 
and while protecting similar values the decisions of the 
Supreme Court have never established a total congruence 
between the two. Thus, introduction of certain evidence 
could fall within an accepted exception to the hearsay 
rules and, yet, contravene the accused's constitutional 
rights of confrontation. 
, " 
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' 
provirl("c' a means of attacking their credibility and thus the 
,~ubst:lrlce of their testimony. In a proceeding such as 
the preliminary examination, where the credibility of the 
witnesses is an 3 ~mportant element in the determination of probable cause, the recogn1t1on of a procedural right of 
cross-examination is essential to the preservation of a fair 
hearing. The introduction of certain material testimony, 
albeit under the hearsay exemption granted by 77-15-19, 
would seriously curtail the defendants ability to present an 
affirmative defense at the preliminary hearing by denying 
him the protections provided by the confrontation of wit-
nesses against him. 
If the preliminary examination is to retain any 
meaningful significance in the criminal prosecution and 
provide an effective means of weeding out improvident prose-
cutions, the protections attendant the defendant's right to. 
present an affirmative defense cannot be circumvented by 
allowing the prosecution t~3base its showing of probable 
cause on hearsay evidence. Therefore, the trial court's 
interpretation of 77-15-19, which allowed the prosecution to 
present the testimony of a material witness via an extra 
judicium affidavit, cannot be accepted. 
Additionally, the ancillary benefits inherent in 
this preliminary proceeding, e.g., the various aspects of 
discovery incident to the pretrial examination of prosecu-
tion witnesses, would be seriously curtailed by denying the 
defendant a right of confrontation at the hearing. This 
curtailment would infringe upon the defendant's right to a 
fair trial, by denying him the opportunity Lo prepare an 
effective defense. 
For example, the cross-examination of witnesses at 
this preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution provides 
the defendant an opportunity to attack their testimony 
before it becomes immutable by repetition and the in-
fluence, however legitimate, of the prosecution. Also, 
favorable testimony will often be elicited from the cross-
examination of the witnesses at the preliminary examination 
32. See Myers, supra note 12, at 826. 
33. Cf. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
("The right to counsel which Coleman declared would amount 
to no more than a pious overture unless it is a right to 
counsel able to function efficaciously in his client's 
behalf." at 1205); Analogous to this reasoning is the 
conclusion that the extensive use of hearsay evidence at 
grand jury proceedinRS tends to destroy the protection from 
Urtl'.'arranted prosecutior1s that grand juries are supposed to 
afford the innocent. See United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 
725 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 940, 17 L.Ed.2d 
872, 87 S.Ct. 975, appeal dismLssed, 389 U.S. 80, 19 L.Ed.2d 
255, 88 S.Ct. 253, reh. denied, 389 U.S. 1025, 19 L.Ed.2d 
fi75, gg S.Ct. 583 (1967). See also United States v. Hubbard, 
GOJ f.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1979). 
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( ( 
and contradictory statements m:ccle at the hear.ing may subse-
quently become important as toCJls for attack~~g the crerli-
bility of the witnesses at the actual trial.· 
However, recognition of the right of confrontat 1,r 
at the preliminary examination does not change the charact·"· 
of that proceeding. It must still retain its preliminary 
nature and is not to be considered a full trial on the 
merits. The prosecution is not required to introduce its 
entire case at the hearing but, rather, need only introduce 
that quantum of evidence necessary to surmount their burd~ 
of proving probable cause. The recognition of the right 0 1 , 
confrontation at the preliminary examination merely demaa~ 
the prosecution's use of hearsay evidence at the hearing~· 
not circumvent the defendant's substantive rights to a fair. 1 
hearing and a fair trial, by denying the defendant an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who offer testi~" 
at the hearing. 
We must turn now to determine the effect of this 
holding in the present case. Al though the judge's in terpre-
tation of the statute and his acceptance of the hearsay I 
evidence constitute error, that error was not prejudicial 1 
to the defendants. Rather, in this case, the error was / 
rendered harmless by the testimony of the other witnessesr' 
the hearing. Their testimony, when considered in conjunct1' 
with the copies of the false sta ternen ts signed by Applegat· 
which were presented at the hearing, was sufficient to 
surmount the prosecution's burden and establish sufficient 
cause to bind the matter over to trial. The introductioo · 
the sworn affidavit of Apple~~a te was in actuality favorable, 
to the defendants because it provided additional discoven 
and possible impeachment evider1ce. Thus, the character of 
the error and the defendants' failure to prove any signi-
ficant prejudice denie~5 a reversal of the present con-
viction based upon it.· 
The conviction of Brackenbury, however, must~ 
overturned, because of the immunity granted to him priort 
trial. Under the powers vested in the prosecuting attorM 
by 77-45-21, he solicited pre-trial testimony from Brae~· 
bury by granting; " •• immunity only to the incident 
relating to the bar and to James Garner and to his [Brar~ 
bury) activities as Justice of the Peace in relation to 
arrests and the people brought before him." 
Applegate's testimony at trial indicated he wa' 
under arrest at the time of the incident, and the Justic•' 
Court of Soldiers Summit was declared in session by Brae'" 
bury before Applegate was intimidated into signing the 
34. California v. Green, supra note 31. 
35. See Stnte v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2cl TiC 
(1066); State v. Lihbey, 224 Or. 431, 356 P.2d lGl (l~iGO 
See also People v. Neal, 53 Cal.App.2d 379, 127 P.2d 9% 
( 1942). 
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staternents in question. Therefore, the present prosecution 
falls within the3 ~cope of immunity granted by the prose-
cut1np; attorney. 
While we believe justice requires the vacation of 
Drackenbury's conviction, we in no way condone his actions. 
!!is conduct is severely censured. The Justice of the Peace 
Association should investigate such activity. 
Because of our application of Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution, we need not consider the 
appellants' federal constitutional claims. After thorough 
consideration of the other points presented on appeal, we 
conclude they are without merit. 
WE CONCUR: 
D. Frank Wilkins, Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
36. See State v. Ward, Utah, 571 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1977) 
[Wilkins dissent]. The state may not claim any benefit from 
the ambiguous nature of the prosecuting attorney's grant of 
immunity, and any questions of interpretation must be re-
solved in favor of the defendant. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: (Concurring in result, with comments.) 
I concur in the result of the main opinion, but 
feel impelled to make some observations. 
1e According to my understanding of the opinion, its 
import is that if Sectio11 77-15-19, U.C.A. is applied iu 
accordance with its terns, by adoitting evidence by hearsay or 
~ by affidavit, it is in violation of constitutional safeguards. 
With this I cannot agree. The statute impresses me as being 
carefully and advisedly drawn, with adequate protections for 
the rights of an accused, and of the public; and that it is 
1a: therefore fair and constitutional if properly applied. 
'" It is also pertinent to observe that the courts 
should not reach out and hold a statute unconstitutional in 
the n.bstract, hut should do so only if it is in violation of 
-13- No. 16372 
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the constitutional rights of the pr~rson cor"pl:tLning. 1 'I~e 
main opinion itself propt'rly points out that what wa'; dor,,, 
in applying Section 77-15-19 in thic; case rr•sultecl i 11 no 
prejudice to the defendants. I am therefor<' unable to see 
justification or purpos2 in attacking either that statute ur 
its application herein. 
I agree that the grant of irnmun i ty by the county 1' 
attorney to defendant Brackenbury is fairly understood to 
include what was done with respect to the prospective witness' 
Applegate; and that the charge against him should be disrnissJ 
·1 
1. Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978). 
2. That when the court determines that a statute does not 
apµly in a case, it should not go further and consider its I 
validity, see 3 Am. Jur. 383; Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 
368, 374 P.2d 839 (1962); State v. Granato, Utah,_ P.2d I 
~- (#16365, decided April 11, 1980). 
HALL, Justice: (Concurring in result) r' 
I concur in the disposition of the appeal, but . 
reserve judgment on the constitutional issue discussed in thf' 
main S_>Pinion since it is not es sen ti al to the decision in th 
case. 
1. See Hoyle v. \lonson, Utah, 606 P.2d 240 (1980), seeals 
Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 378 P.2d 839 (1966). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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